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Abstract: Is disgust morally valuable? The answer to that question turns, in large 
part, on what we can do to shape disgust for the better. But this cultivation 
question has received surprisingly little attention in philosophical debates. To 
address this deficiency, this paper examines empirical work on disgust and emotion 
regulation. This research reveals that while we can exert some control over how 
we experience disgust, there’s little we can do to substantively change it at a more 
fundamental level. These empirical insights have revisionary implications both for 
debates about disgust’s moral value, and for our understanding of agency and 
moral development more generally. 
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Debates about disgust’s relevance in ethics tend to focus narrowly on the question of whether 
disgust is morally valuable.1 But this overlooks a deeper question about the moral psychology of 
disgust: Is disgust an emotion we can cultivate? To draw out the significance of this cultivation 
question, notice that a central concern raised by those skeptical of disgust’s value focuses on its 
unreliability: disgust lacks moral value because it’s too easy to become disgusted by the morally 
benign. Clearly, this concern has more bite if there’s little we can do to shape errant disgust for the 
better. But despite all this, questions about our ability to cultivate disgust have received surprisingly 
little attention.2 This suggests that if we’re to make progress on questions about disgust’s value, we 
need to look at empirical research on disgust and emotion regulation. When we do this, we see that 
although one can exert some control over how one experiences moral disgust, there’s little one can do 
to substantively change it at a deeper level. This empirical insight brings two lessons. First, with regard 
to debates about disgust’s value, we learn that both skeptics and advocates are mistaken: disgust is 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Kass, 1997; Kelly, 2011; Kelly & Morar, 2014; Knapp, 2003; Kumar, 2017; Miller, 1997; Nussbaum, 
2004; Plakias, 2013. 
2 Kelly & Morar, 2014 is an exception. 
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morally valuable, but not in the ways it’s standardly thought to be. Second, recognizing that we can 
manage—but not change—disgust also has implications for our understanding of virtue and its 
development: it suggests, with Kantians, that the development of virtue is more a matter of 
enhancing self-control and less, as Aristotelians propose, a matter of securing psychological 
harmony among one’s feelings, thoughts, and motivations.  
Here’s the plan. After briefly discussing some terminology (§1), I turn to the question of 
what disgust is in order to highlight some of disgust’s central, but often overlooked features (§2). I 
then take up the question of whether disgust is morally valuable. As we’ll see, looking at the existing 
debate reveals that questions about disgust’s moral value turn on questions about whether disgust 
can be cultivated (§3). I then draw on empirical findings to vet the three dominant philosophical 
accounts of emotion cultivation (§4). Building from the lessons gleaned from this investigation, I 
draw out a set of revisionary conclusions about the moral value of disgust (§5) and explore further 
implications this might have for our understanding of virtue (§6). 
1. Emotions and Emotion Cultivation 
To situate the discussion that follows, here’s how I will be understanding emotions like disgust and 
the process of emotion cultivation.3 Taking these in turn, I’ll assume that emotions have two general 
features. First, they’re intentional states that can be (in)correct or (un)fitting in virtue of having 
content that (mis)represents the situation at hand. Second, emotions represent the features of one’s 
situation in an evaluatively loaded way. Consider a toy example. To be disgusted by the rotting meat 
is to see it as contaminated—as something to be avoided or rejected. Thus, one’s disgust will be fitting just 
in case the meat really is contaminated. Moreover, to say that an emotion is fitting is to make a 
                                                 
3 I take this picture to be generally (but not universally) accepted among emotion theorists in general, as well as those 
whose accounts I will be discussing.  
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distinctive type of evaluation: the situation is as the emotion presents it to be. Thus, one’s disgust 
could be fitting but nonetheless imprudent or immoral (e.g., while disgust is a fitting response to a 
festering wound, it may be imprudent, even immoral, for a doctor to feel it if that would undermine 
her ability to care for her patient). 
Turning to the second issue—how can we cultivate emotions—I assume that emotions like 
disgust are at least somewhat malleable: unlike homeostatic mechanisms or reflexes, disgust is 
something whose functioning we can shape and educate. To further flesh this out, a couple of 
elaborations will be helpful. 
First, I take “emotion cultivation” to refer to our intentional efforts to bring lasting changes 
to when and how we experience a particular emotion so as to promote certain values. On this front, 
we find (e.g.) Aristotelian strategies of habituation, Stoic extirpation therapies, and Kantian 
techniques of moral education via catechistic instruction. But for what follows, we should also 
distinguish two distinct, but potentially overlapping, ways in which disgust (say) might be 
“cultivated.” First, we can cultivate disgust by changing the emotion itself. Alternatively, we can shape 
disgust by changing the non-disgust mechanisms that influence when and how one feels the emotion 
(e.g., general attentional or cognitive systems, display rules, motor control systems). Putting this 
another way, if we assume disgust is a disposition, then the first model of cultivation is one that 
changes the disposition itself; the second model, by contrast, doesn’t change the disposition, but 
rather shapes other cognitive systems that can mask, inhibit, or mimic the operation of the disgust 
disposition. Moreover, while some cultivation strategies—like Aristotelian habituation—are 
plausibly understood as seeking to change the disposition, others—like reappraisal—seem better 
understood as, in the first place, indirect efforts aimed at inhibiting or masking the underlying 
disposition. So while there’s a sense in which both ways of changing when and how one feels disgust 
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are forms of “cultivation,” it’s also clear that only the former involves genuine change to the 
emotion itself—the latter better understood as a kind of “shaping-by-proxy.” Of course, exactly how 
this distinction is drawn will turn on one’s theory of emotion—specifically, how one distinguishes 
between emotions and the non-emotion mechanisms that shape them. What’s important for our 
purposes is that the standard emotion theories all accept this distinction and so allow that there are 
two distinct ways of cultivating an emotion like disgust.4 
Second, since disgust can contribute to a range of instrumental and non-instrumental values, 
we can assess its cultivatability across various evaluative dimensions. Here, I focus on cultivating 
disgust in ways that will improve its tendency to promote non-instrumental value—particularly, 
moral and aretaic value. More specifically, I will argue that disgust can be a fitting response: one’s 
disgust fits when its target is as one’s disgust presents it to be. Given this, two questions are of 
interest. First, what can we do to improve our ability to experience fitting disgust? Second, given that 
even fitting disgust can cause trouble (because, for instance, the response is too extreme), what can 
we do to improve our ability to experience it in the right ways—ways conducive to the realization of 
moral or aretaic value? With this background in hand, we can turn to the details of disgust.  
2. What is Disgust? 
At its core, disgust is an emotion whose characteristic concern is contamination, broadly construed: to 
be disgusted by something is to see that thing as, in some way, dirty, diseased, corrupting, offensive, 
or otherwise sickening. Moreover, and importantly for what’s to come, though there’s debate about 
how this general notion of contamination should be understood, the general picture is widely 
                                                 
4 The psychological literature tends to focus on emotion regulation, not cultivation (e.g., Gross, 2015). The difference 
between regulation and cultivation is murky. But one way to understand it is that, in contrast to cultivation, regulation 
typically refers to our unconscious efforts to affect short-term changes in when/how we experience an emotion. This allows, 
of course, that regulation techniques (e.g., attention redirection, response modulation) can be enlisted as part of one’s 
efforts to affect long-term change via cultivation.  
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endorsed by both advocates and skeptics of disgust’s moral value (e.g., Kelly, 2011; Kumar, 2017; 
Plakias, 2013; Nussbaum, 2004; Miller, 1997). To get a better sense of what disgust is, we can say 
more about its characteristic “inputs” and “outputs.”  
On the input side, disgust has four noteworthy features. First, though there are common 
themes in what disgusts us—principally, feces, bodily fluids, disease, decay, creepy-crawlies, and 
social/moral norm violations—the range of things that can elicit disgust is strikingly diverse (Kelly, 
2011; Miller, 1997; Tyber et al., 2009; Rozin et al., 2008). Second, disgust sensitivities have a 
distinctive developmental trajectory: around 3 years of age, children begin developing sensitivities to 
“core” or pathogen-oriented elicitors (e.g., feces, rotting food, bodily fluids); later, around age 7, we 
see sensitivities to “social/moral” elicitors emerging (e.g., food taboos, cheating) (Stevenson et al., 
2010; Rozin et al., 2000). This suggests that the development of social/moral disgust is dependent 
on an individual’s conceptual competence in ways that the development of core disgust is not. 
Third, disgust sensitivities are very easy to develop. As incidents with food poisoning make plain, it 
often takes just one unfortunate experience with tuna-salad-gone-bad for one to become disgusted 
by fishy things (Oaten et al., 2009; Garcia et al., 1974). Importantly, the tendency for disgust 
sensitivities to be quickly acquired is not limited to just edible elicitors. For instance, experimental 
work reveals that infants display greater aversion behavior (e.g., avoidance, disengagement) to a 
novel toy when they’ve seen an adult respond to it with disgust, than when the adult responds in a 
neutral or positive manner (Carver & Vaccaro, 2007; Hertenstein & Campos, 2004). Finally, as 
suggested by the novel toy experiments, developmental research indicates that parents’ disgust 
responses play a significant role in shaping which core and social/moral disgust sensitivities their 
children acquire (Rottman et al., 2018; Oaten et al., 2014; Stevenson et al., 2010).  
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Turning to the output side, we find that the diversity of disgust elicitors, and the ease with 
which they can be developed, is not mirrored in the resulting disgust behaviors. Rather, we find a 
comparatively narrow and rigid response. The disgust response is narrow in that disgust elicitors—
both core and social/moral—bring a strikingly uniform tendency to reject, purge, or avoid the 
object of one’s disgust. This pattern of response is accompanied by the distinctive “gape” face as 
well as thoughts of the elicitor as contaminated or polluting (Kelly, 2011; Kumar, 2017; Nussbaum, 
2004).  
The disgust response is rigid—both synchronically and diachronically. Synchronically, particular 
disgust episodes are “ballistic” in the following sense: disgust’s coordinated pattern of behavior 
appears quickly and automatically, and, once engaged, the disgust response is very difficult to halt or 
modify. Paul Rozin’s work provides vivid examples: individuals refuse to drink out of a bedpan even 
though they’ve been told it was just sterilized or eat fudge shaped like dog poop despite being 
informed it’s gourmet quality (e.g., Rozin et al., 1986). Importantly, we see this rigid, ballistic 
response not just with regard to core disgust elicitors, but also morally offensive ones. For instance, 
individuals refuse to wear a sweater they were told belonged to a murderer and their refusal persists 
even after being informed that the sweater had been washed (Rozin et al., 1986). But the disgust 
response is also diachronically rigid. As we’ll see at length below (§4), disgust responses are—in 
comparison to the responses of emotions like fear, anxiety, and anger—difficult to change or modify 
through (say) repeated exposure or education (Olatunji et al., 2009; Hoyer et al., 2011; Kurth, 2018a, 
2018b).  
For the discussion that follows, it’s worth highlighting what the above observations suggest 
about both disgust’s underlying cognitive mechanisms and its evolutionary origins. First consider 
disgust’s cognitive architecture. On the input side, we can see that disgust is underwritten by learning 
7 
 
mechanisms that allow for the quick (often one-shot) acquisition of disgust sensitivities to a wide 
range of elicitors—from feces and blood to social/moral violations. By contrast, the mechanisms 
underlying disgust’s outputs are significantly less flexible: not only are they unresponsive to our 
efforts to modify them in the moment (synchronic rigidity), but they’re also resistant to change 
through exposure and habituation (diachronic rigidity) (see Rozin et al., 2000. p. 766 for a similar 
point). So—and this will be important going forward—while disgust sensitivities are easy to acquire, 
once developed, they tend to ossify, becoming rigid and entrenched in their effects on our behavior.  
These lessons about disgust’s cognitive architecture get further support from research 
examining its evolutionary origins. The general consensus takes disgust to be an evolutionarily 
shaped defense mechanism: one that was initially oriented toward protecting individuals from 
biological contaminants, but that has subsequently expanded in scope to also guard against social 
and moral “contaminants” (e.g., Rozin et al., 2008; Kelly, 2011; Tybur et al., 2013; Plakias, 2013; 
Kumar, 2017. C.f., Rottman et al., 2018). Moreover, this evolutionary account is also thought to 
explain many of disgust’s distinctive features (Kelly, 2011; Tybur et al., 2013; Plakias, 2013; Kumar, 
2017). For instance, if disgust began as a pathogen-defense mechanism, then that helps explain its 
distinctive cognitive architecture. Flexible learning mechanisms would allow an individual to guard 
against the distinctive pathogens of its environment. Similarly, a ballistic and diachronically rigid 
reject/purge response would not only allow for immediate protection against perceived 
contaminants, but also help prevent an individual from again eating something that had made it 
sick—hence, the tendency for disgust sensitivities to ossify once acquired. Finally, if disgust began as 
a contaminant-protection mechanism that was co-opted to serve a role in protecting social and 
moral boundaries, then it’s unsurprising that its key features—e.g., “one-shot” learning, ossification, 
a strong, automatic reject/purge response—are found not just in core disgust, but also its social and 
moral varieties.  
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A final point. Though controversial, a growing body of research in philosophy and cognitive 
science suggests there’s a distinctly moral form of disgust—the disgust experienced toward 
hypocrisy, cheating, cruelty, and the like (Giner-Sorolla et al., 2018; Kumar, 2017; Plakias, 2018. C.f., 
Piazza et al., 2018). Support for this comes from various sources. First, there’s the contamination 
connection: hypocrisy, cheating, etc. are behaviors that can contaminate beneficial social interactions 
(Boehm, 2012; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Kumar, 2017; Plakias, 2018). Moreover, while these 
behaviors are unlike core and taboo-oriented disgust elicitors in that they lack an overt connection 
to pathogen-related features (decay, bodily fluid), empirical work suggests they are nonetheless 
conceptually marked as the actions of someone with a deviant, degraded, or otherwise corrupting 
character (Katzer et al., 2018, study 2; Giner-Sorolla et al., 2018; Giner-Sorolla & Chapman, 2017). 
Finally, behaviors like cruelty and cheating can elicit disgust’s characteristic responses, including: 
cleanliness behavior (Jones & Fitness, 2008, study 1), reduced consumption (Chen et al., 2014), and 
reject/purge/avoid efforts (Chapman et al., 2009).5 
With an understanding of what disgust is in hand, we can turn to questions about its value.  
3. Is Disgust Morally Valuable? 
The above sketch suggests disgust can be a fitting and valuable response to biological contaminants. 
Disgust toward rotting meat or a decaying corpse is fitting because those things are as disgust 
presents them to be—namely, putrid, diseased, or otherwise sickening. Moreover, our tendency to 
react to perceived biological contaminants with disgust’s strong reject/purge/avoid response is 
instrumentally valuable—an effective (if imperfect [Sripada & Stich, 2004]) defense against poisons, 
parasites, and disease.  
                                                 
5 Given the argument to come, it’s worth noting that the claim that moral disgust is a form of disgust appears to be 
accepted by both advocates (e.g., Kumar, 2017; Miller, 1997) and skeptics (e.g., Nussbaum, 2004; Kelly, 2018).  
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Keeping the distinction between fitting and morally valuable disgust in mind, we can make 
two further observations. First, disgust is often thought to be a fitting response to social/moral 
contaminants. It’s fitting to be disgusted by things like pedophilia, cheating, and cruelty since these 
acts are as disgust presents them: sickening, corrupting, and offensive.6 Second, and more 
controversially, given the offensive, corrupting nature of those acts, feelings of revulsion and the 
associated thoughts that disgust brings can be both morally appropriate and morally valuable.  
To draw out the controversy about disgust’s moral significance, we can start with the case 
made by disgust’s advocates. First, consider the claim that disgust can be a morally appropriate 
response. In defense of this, William Miller explains that “there are those vices and offenses for 
which notions of ugliness, smelliness, sliminess readily apply and those for which they do not. 
Hypocrisy, betrayal, cruelty put us in the swamp of the disgusting, and no other moral sentiment 
seems as well qualified to express our disapprobation” (1997, p. 205; Plakias, 2013). Pushing further, 
the (diachronic) rigidity and force of the disgust response can serve as a powerful signal of one’s 
commitment to defending the values threatened by the disgust-eliciting behavior—disgust “marks 
out moral matters for which we can have no compromise” (Miller, 1997, p. 194; also Kass, 1997; 
Kumar, 2017). Similarly, the rejection behavior that disgust brings “is often an apt form of 
punishment for those who cheat, act dishonestly, or exploit others, since these people morally 
pollute constructive and beneficial social interaction, and thus subvert cooperation” (Kumar, 2017; 
Plakias, 2018). Here it’s worth emphasizing that in discussing disgust’s moral value, advocates readily 
acknowledge that the emotion can misfire (e.g., Miller, 1997, pp. 197-202; Kumar, 2017; Plakias, 
2018). But they nonetheless insist that disgust is a “highly flexible” response, one that “is—or can 
be—reliably attuned to genuine moral wrongs” (Kumar, 2017, p. 10; Miller, 1997, pp. 202-203).  
                                                 
6 This point is endorsed by both advocates and (some) skeptics (e.g., Kumar, 2017; Plakias, 2018; Nussbaum, 2004, pp. 
102-103; Kelly, 2011, p. 151; Miller, 1997. C.f., Knapp, 2003). 
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We get a very different assessment from disgust skeptics. More specifically, while skeptics 
seem willing to allow that disgust can be a fitting response in the moral domain (e.g., Kelly, 2011, p. 
151; Nussbaum, 2004, pp. 101-106; c.f., Knapp, 2003), they deny it’s morally valuable. For one, these 
skeptics maintain that disgust is a hopelessly unreliable detector of moral contaminants: given how 
flexible disgust’s acquisition mechanisms are, it’s just too easy for us to become disgusted by the 
morally benign. Moreover, this flexibility makes disgust too easy to manipulate for nefarious 
purposes. Not only is history rich in examples of individuals (e.g., women, Jews) being portrayed as 
having “stock disgust-properties”—being diseased, dirty, or smelly—in order to elicit disgust in their 
persecutors (Nussbaum, 2004, pp. 107-115), but the targets of these attacks can also come to see 
themselves as “contaminated” or “disgusting” (Niemi, 2018). Moreover, the strong, ballistic 
reject/avoid response that disgust brings means that, even when disgust happens to be a fitting 
response (e.g., it’s provoked by hypocritical behavior), it will nonetheless tend to be morally harmful 
(Kelly, 2011; Kelly & Morar, 2014; Nussbaum, 2004). In fact, empirical work suggests there’s a link 
between feelings of disgust and dehumanization: individuals who become targets of disgust also tend 
to be viewed as less than fully human by those who find them disgusting (Young & Saxe, 2011; 
Harris & Fiske, 2006).7 Adding to this, skeptics also have little faith in our ability to shape disgust for 
the better: given the way that disgust portrays its target—as contaminated and contaminating—they 
maintain that disgust “will be difficult to contain or aim with any degree of precision” (Kelly & 
Morar, 2014, p. 163; Nussbaum, 2004, pp. 101-106). In short, disgust’s resistance to being corrected 
or changed means not only that it is “always of dubious reliability” in the moral domain, but also 
that it will too readily prompt a harmful “demonization and dehumanization” of its targets (Kelly, 
2011, pp. 146-52; Nussbaum, 2004, chap. 2).  
                                                 
7 It’s important to note that this empirical work is merely correlational—as such, it does not determine whether disgust 
causes dehumanization or vice versa (Kumar, 2017).  
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It’s worth highlighting that the skeptics’ worry here is less the concern that disgust is 
inherently lacking in moral value, and more the concern that disgust is too unreliable and too likely 
to do harm. That is, skeptics maintain that disgust lacks moral value because we’re unable to 
effectively change or correct it. Recognizing this is significant, though too often overlooked. It 
means that debates about disgust’s moral value are ultimately debates about disgust’s susceptibility to 
cultivation. But, to date, too little has been done to assess this question: Can disgust be cultivated?  
In what follows, I examine three prominent philosophical proposals for cultivating disgust, 
vetting them against our best empirical understanding of how disgust works. This will reveal that 
both disgust skeptics and advocates are mistaken about disgust’s moral value.  
4. Can Disgust be Cultivated? 
(4.1) Education and enculturation. The first philosophical proposal for how to cultivate disgust 
emphasizes learning: the flexibility of disgust’s learning mechanisms means we can shape disgust for 
the better through education and enculturation (Kumar, 2017). But what we’ve learned about how 
disgust sensitivities are developed suggests that the flexibility of these learning mechanisms is more 
likely to be a liability than an asset. For one, there’s the ease and speed with which disgust 
sensitivities can be acquired—recall that we find evidence of “one-shot” learning for a wide range of 
elicitors, and not just food-based ones. Add to this that there are few restrictions on the types of 
things that we can become disgusted by. Features like these suggest that what we come to see as a 
moral contaminant, and so morally disgusting, will be significantly influenced by luck and chance—
as much a function of the experiences we just happen to have, as our deliberate efforts to shape 
what disgusts us. This is all the more so given, as we saw (§2), developmental findings indicate that 
feedback from our caretakers is a central driver of which (moral) disgust sensitivities we come to 
have. Of course, culture can act as a buffer, bringing accumulated insight about what to be disgusted 
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by. But even granting this, the problem remains. The haphazardness of culturally-driven food taboos 
reveals that we can easily become disgusted by things that pose no (biological, social/moral) 
contamination risk (Sripada & Stich, 2004). Moreover, even if one’s cultural norms are morally 
sound, one’s parents may not be.  
Victor Kumar seems sensitive to this issue. To head it off, he suggests that the learning 
mechanisms responsible for the development of moral disgust sensitivities are different from the one-
shot learning mechanisms driving the development of disgust toward core disgust elicitors. But if 
there’s no one-shot learning for moral content, then—contra the above—there’s no reason to think 
moral disgust cannot be educated. To defend the claim that moral disgust sensitivities don’t come by 
way of core disgust’s one-shot learning mechanism, Kumar argues that while there are identifiable 
adaptive advantages to such a learning mechanism for a pathogen-oriented disgust sensitivity (e.g., 
it’s better to be safe than sorry), there’s no comparable adaptive advantage for a one-shot learning 
mechanism for moral violations. As he explains, an “over-sensitivity to cheaters is no more 
advantageous than under-sensitivity to cheaters” (2017, p. 6).  
However, for this response to work, moral disgust sensitivities must come exclusively (or 
predominantly) from the alternative learning mechanism that Kumar posits. But this suggestion is 
challenged by experimental findings indicating that there’s one-shot learning for objects like toys 
that do not have a pathogen connection (§2). Moreover, Kumar’s proposal also sits uncomfortably 
with our understanding of evolution as a conservative process, one that tends to reuse and repurpose 
mechanisms that already exist even when doing so is (somewhat) sub-optimal all things considered. 
Thus, on a more plausible evolutionary account, moral disgust sensitivities are the product of two 
learning mechanisms: the one-shot mechanism inherited from our (evolutionary and 
developmentally more basic) core disgust, and the (more evolutionarily recent) mechanism Kumar 
proposes.  
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Together, these observations suggest our disgust sensitivities—including moral ones—are 
likely to be shaped, in significant ways, by chance and fortune. If that’s right, then we should 
investigate what can be done to eliminate or mitigate morally problematic disgust sensitivities once 
they have been acquired. 
(4.2) Aristotelian habituation and exposure. Turning to strategies that might allow us to eliminate 
or change the disgust sensitivities we happen to develop, one prominent suggestion points to 
Aristotelian habituation. Justin D’Arms, for example, argues that “since our [emotions] are shaped 
by experience, it seems we can train them by influencing the experiences to which they are exposed” 
(2013, p. 9). In the context of disgust, he suggests getting oneself to try foods that one initially finds 
disgusting (his example: cod milt—or fish sperm) as a way of testing, and so potentially altering, the 
range of things one is disgusted by. Kumar (2017) supplements this suggestion, pointing to research 
on mothers’ responses to the smell of their babies’ soiled diapers as evidence of disgust’s 
susceptibility to being shaped through exposure: new parents become less disgusted by the smell of 
dirty diapers, especially those of their own children (Case et al., 2006). In a similar vein, Paul Rozin 
(2008) found that medical school students showed reduced disgust sensitivity toward human 
cadavers after spending several months dissecting them. Together, these observations seem to 
license optimism about our ability to change (moral) disgust sensitivities for the better. 
However, in assessing this habituation proposal, it’s worth first noting that while there’s a 
significant amount of empirical work highlighting the effectiveness of exposure as a tool for acquiring 
disgust sensitivities, we find less work examining the effectiveness of exposure-based techniques to 
habituate ourselves out of the disgust sensitivities that we’ve developed. Moreover, the work that has 
been done does not support the habituation line. Rather, the general trend in this research indicates 
that disgust sensitivities are “little affected” by efforts to lessen or eliminate them through 
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habituation and exposure (Meunier & Tolin, 2009; also: Engelhard et al., 2014, study 1; Mason & 
Richards, 2010; Olatunji et al., 2007). And when we look more closely at the findings that 
proponents point to, we find they offer—at best—thin support.  
First consider Kumar’s appeal to the diaper experiment. The fact that the mitigating effect of 
the diaper exposure on one’s disgust was found to be greater with regard to one’s own baby suggests 
it’s not the disgust response itself that’s changing. Rather, it seems that an independent kin-detection 
mechanism is being engaged—and is moderating—the disgust response. Putting this into the 
language of cultivation and shaping-by-proxy (§1), what we appear to have in the diaper case is—
pace Kumar—not evidence of the cultivation of disgust via habituation, but rather the shaping of 
other (kin-detection) mechanisms that then indirectly affect how disgust is experienced. Support for 
this alternative explanation comes from two sources. First, research indicates that mothers have a 
general preference for the smell of their own children (Weisfeld et al., 2003) and that parents invest 
more time and energy in children whose scent they recognize (Dubas et al., 2009). Second, work 
examining why disgust, in general, tends to be felt less toward “one’s own” than for “others” 
highlights, not one’s interaction with the person in question (as the Kumar exposure explanation 
predicts), but rather that person’s status as an in-group member (as suggested by the alternative 
explanation) (Reicher et al., 2016). In light of all this, we should be skeptical of Kumar’s claim that 
the Case et al. experiment is evidence of our ability to use habituation to cultivate disgust.  
The force of the Rozin cadaver study is also questionable. For starters, and as Rozin himself 
notes, while exposure reduced the disgust sensitivity of medical school students to the cold cadavers 
of the dissection lab, it had no effect on the disgust they felt toward touching the sill warm bodies of 
the recently deceased! Moreover, others argue that these results are likely to generalize in 
problematic ways: though the disgust one feels toward same-sex marriage may diminish after talking 
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with the lesbian couple that moved in next door, it’s unlikely to mitigate one’s disgust toward, say, 
marriage between gay men, adoption by gay couples, or the sexual relationships of transgender 
individuals (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013). Such fine-grained results suggest exposure should not be 
thought of as a particularly effective tool for correcting (morally) problematic disgust sensitivities.  
We get further cause for concern from work highlighting the persistence of disgust in 
individuals who have had significant exposure to disgust elicitors that they don’t want to be so 
sensitive to. For instance, experimental work reveals that disgust-driven biases toward homosexuals 
and minorities persist even among liberal, educated individuals (as measured by self-reports as well 
as physiological and behavioral responses) (Kiebel et al., 2017; also, Devine et al., 2002; Greenwald 
& Banaji, 1995). A different line of research on perpetrator disgust—disgust felt by, e.g., Nazis as 
they commit atrocities—also highlights the difficulties of eliminating (or even mitigating) disgust 
through exposure: while the disgust of some perpetrators appears to fade, many others remain 
disgusted by the awful acts they do (Much-Jurisic, 2018).8 These distinct lines of research are telling 
both because they complicate the Rozin findings, and because they highlight the significant difficulty 
of eliminating unwanted disgust through habituation.  
Taken together, then, this closer look at the empirical work on habituation suggests that 
even if we grant that exposure can help correct the disgust sensitivities we happen to have acquired, 
we must also acknowledge that it’s likely to bring—at best—only very narrow, hard won results. 
But the prospects of habituation as a corrective for morally problematic disgust are likely 
even worse than what the above discussion suggests. To see this, notice that most of the existing 
research on the effectiveness of exposure-based techniques focuses on core disgust. This is 
                                                 
8 There’s reason to be cautious about the apparent “success” that some perpetrators appear to have in ridding 
themselves of their disgust: not only does most of the evidence come from self-reports, but the perpetrators also often 
have strong motivations for denying that they felt disgusted by what they did (e.g., in order to be seen as a good Nazi). 
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significant in two ways. For starters, some of the most frequently discussed forms of morally 
problematic disgust concern disgust toward what have been called “bodily” moral violations—
actions that run afoul of moral norms about what one can do with one’s body (e.g., taboo sexual 
practices, cannibalism). Moreover, disgust toward bodily moral violations (e.g., homosexuality) 
appears to be driven less by moral content (e.g., harm, injustice) and more by pathogen-related 
features (e.g., bodily fluids, feces) (Chapman & Anderson, 2013; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013). 
Now here’s the rub: the fact that bodily moral violations incorporate core disgust elicitors suggests 
that the ineffectiveness of exposure-based techniques for pathogen-oriented core disgust will also 
plague efforts to use these techniques to correct similarly problematic disgust toward bodily moral 
violations. So not only does disgust resist correction via habituation, but it’s likely to do so for the 
situations we’re most concerned to correct. 
This leads to the second issue: while exposure is unlikely to be an effective corrective for 
bodily moral violations, the proponent of the habituation strategy might nonetheless think it has 
promise as a way to moderate problematic disgust responses to non-bodily moral violations (e.g., the 
demonizing of cheaters). After all, such violations lack the independently disgusting content (blood, 
feces) thought to explain the resistance to exposure-based correction efforts. However, the 
plausibility of this suggestion is challenged by a pair of empirical findings.  
First, disgust toward non-bodily moral violations systematically co-occurs with anger toward 
those violations. For instance, individuals give nearly identical emotion intensity ratings of disgust 
and anger in response to photos and descriptions of, e.g., hypocritical politicians, racial violence, and 
instances of exploitation (by contrast, there’s no similar overlap in intensity ratings in response to 
core disgust elicitors) (Simpson et al., 2006; also Rozin et al., 2000). Second, there’s a significant 
body of clinical research showing that excessive anger responses are attenuated through exposure-
17 
 
based methods (Henwood et al., 2015; Beck & Fernandez, 1998). Taken together, these findings 
suggest that any behavioral improvements that we see in emotional responses to non-bodily moral 
violations are likely to be the result of the habituation of anger, not disgust. This conclusion gets further 
support from work showing that anger and disgust respond very differently to situational cues and 
new information. For instance, while anger is sensitive to the amount of harm done and the harm-
doer’s intentions, disgust is not (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a, 2011b). What these findings 
suggest, then, is that habituation works for anger, but not disgust, because only in the case of anger do 
we have an emotion whose underlying psychological mechanisms make it amenable to correction 
through exposure and the new information it brings: while disgust responses ossify, anger responses 
don’t. 
(4.3) Copy what works. The final approach grants that given what we know about the 
psychological mechanisms undergirding disgust, attempts to change it via habituation are unlikely to 
succeed. Consequently, we should look to strategies that have proven effective in shaping 
psychological processes that are structurally similar to disgust. Here research on methods for 
mitigating implicit bias offer a promising model (Kelly & Morar, 2014). After all, implicit biases, like 
disgust responses in the moral realm, are socially-learned sensitivities that often operate below the 
level of conscious awareness. Similarly, like disgust, implicit biases are resistant to efforts to directly 
shape them. Given these structural parallels, what might research on implicit bias mitigation 
techniques tell us about how we can cultivate (moral) disgust? 
Generally speaking, there are two broad strategies for combatting implicit bias (Brownstein, 
2015). First, there are change-based strategies which aim to eliminate the underlying beliefs and 
automatic associations that drive the biases. These techniques seek to undermine (e.g.) beliefs that 
white people are smart or associations between “black” and “bad.” Control-based strategies, by 
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contrast, aim to improve an individual’s ability to prevent his biased beliefs/associations from 
affecting his behavior. Here a common method targets implementation intentions—roughly, the “if, 
then” rules that guide our actions. Interventions using implementation intentions might aim to, for 
instance, get an individual to engage a bias-mitigating “if black, then approach” rule rather than a 
bias-oriented “if black, then avoid” rule. Though there’s overlap between change-based strategies 
and the exposure-based techniques of §4.2 (more on this shortly), the control-based strategies that 
make use of implementation intentions are importantly different: rather than attempting to directly 
alter or eliminate unwanted beliefs and associations, these methods take an indirect route—one that 
aims to develop an individual’s higher-order capacity to recognize problematic situations and 
(automatically) engage the relevant control-enhancing implementation intention (Gollwitzer & 
Schaal, 1998). 
Turning to questions of effectiveness, existing research provides us with reasons to be 
concerned about the use of change-based techniques for disgust. But it also suggests we should be 
more optimistic about control-based efforts. Let’s take these in turn. 
The first problem with change-based strategies concerns generalizability: there’s good reason 
to think that the effectiveness of change-based implicit bias strategies will not carry over to (moral) 
disgust. This is because the most prominent change-based interventions—e.g., evaluative 
conditioning (De Houwer, 2011), counter-stereotype exposure (Blair et al., 2001), and increasing 
inter-group contact (Aberson et al., 2008)—are interventions that seek to eliminate biased 
beliefs/attitudes through exposure and conditioning. But, as we just saw, (moral) disgust is little affected 
by exposure-based techniques of this sort (§4.2).  
The second cause for concern is moral. Some of the most effective change-based strategies 
for combatting (say) racial implicit biases are ones that not only aim to change automatic 
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associations by bolstering the links we make between black individuals and positive features (e.g., 
being smart, being friendly), but also seek to bolster associations between white individuals and 
negative features (e.g., being greedy, being uptight) (Lai et al., 2014). This is troubling. It reveals that 
some of the most effective change-based strategies fit poorly with what becoming a more morally 
admirable person involves: even if it’s true that I’m disgusted by Hispanics, it doesn’t follow that, to 
correct this, I ought to undermine the positive associations I have about whites. 
However, while there are good reasons to be concerned with change-based strategies, the 
potential of control-based alternatives looks quite different. For instance, recent work by Inge 
Schweiger Gallo and colleagues has investigated the effectiveness of different implementation 
intention strategies for disgust (Schweiger Gallo et al., 2009, 2012). More specifically, Schweiger 
Gallo’s team examined whether implementation intentions might positively affect both how one 
appraises disgust-eliciting stimuli (e.g., blood, bodily fluid) and how one subsequently responds. In both 
cases, she found that they did. In particular, her team found that implementation intentions targeting 
appraisal (e.g., if I see blood, I’ll take the perspective of a physician) were more effective in reducing 
how unpleasant one takes a stimulus to be when compared to both controls and goal-oriented 
strategies where one just endorses the aim (e.g.) of not getting disgusted. Additionally, this work 
found that implementation intentions targeting response tendencies (e.g., if I see blood, I’ll stay calm 
and relaxed) were also more effective in reducing how repulsed one feels.  
It’s worth highlighting the robustness of the Schweiger Gallo findings. Not only have her 
results been replicated by others (e.g., Gomez et al., 2015; Hallam et al., 2015; Heilman et al., 2010; 
also see the meta-study of Webb et al., 2012), but they also find independent support from work on 
cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) as a treatment for obsessive compulsive disorders (OCD). 
Consider, for instance, research examining the effectiveness of CBT for contamination-oriented 
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OCD—a version of OCD where obsessive thoughts about germs, dirt, and the like lead to 
compulsive cleaning behavior. This work suggests that contamination-oriented OCD is driven, in 
part, by one’s tendency to feel disgust in response to potential contaminants (Olatunji et al., 2011, 
study 1; Husted et al., 2006; Schienle et al., 2003). More importantly, the associated compulsive 
behavior can be reduced through disgust-targeting CBT—specifically, strategies focused on 
bolstering one’s ability to both recognize potential disgust-eliciting contaminants and engage 
techniques aimed at blocking the feelings of disgust that would otherwise result (Olatunji et al., 2011, 
study 2; McKay, 2006). As with Schweiger Gallo’s implementation intention techniques, this CBT-
based strategy does not attempt to directly change disgust via exposure. Rather, it seeks to enhance 
one’s (higher-order) ability to control how one responds to what one finds disgusting.  
In sum, the above observations about implicit bias regulation strategies suggest they can be 
helpful as tools for cultivating (moral) disgust. But we’ve also seen that there are important 
differences in the effectiveness and moral acceptability of particular strategies—on both fronts, 
control-based strategies are better. 
(4.4) Lessons Learned. Bringing this discussion of emotion cultivation strategies to a close, we 
can extract two general lessons. First, the flexibility of disgust’s learning mechanism suggests that it’s 
possible to cultivate morally appropriate disgust. However, the ease with which disgust sensitivities 
can be developed, and the degree of influence that caretakers have over that process, reveals that the 
disgust sensitivities one happens to acquire will be shaped—in significant ways—by luck and chance 
(§4.1). Second, the rigidity of the disgust response—in particular, the tendency for disgust 
sensitivities to ossify once acquired (§2, §4.2)—explains why it’s so difficult to directly change or 
correct them. Moreover, given that this rigidity appears to be a product of disgust’s underlying 
cognitive architecture (§2, §4.2), we should expect that indirect efforts to shape disgust for the better 
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will prove more effective. The results from work on disgust-focused implementation intentions and 
CBT support this prediction. Moreover, while it’s important to recognize that the research on the 
effectiveness of disgust-focused implementation intentions is still in its early stages, the positive 
results we find across different labs and using different experimental paradigms (§4.3) stands in 
contrast to the (at best) equivocal findings regarding the effectiveness of habituation, exposure, and 
related change-oriented techniques (§§4.2-4.3). Putting all this in the language of §1, while the 
prospects for the cultivation of disgust are dim, the potential for shaping-by-proxy look more promising.  
5. Reassessing Disgust’s Moral Value: Two Implications 
Learning about how disgust responds to our efforts to shape it has two implications for our 
understanding of disgust’s moral value. The first concerns what we should do to address morally 
problematic disgust. Given the structural and moral concerns uncovered above, efforts to shape 
disgust for the better should emphasize control-based strategies. That is, our efforts should focus 
not on (direct) attempts to change what we are disgusted by, but rather on (indirect) efforts to enhance 
self-control. To see what this might amount to, consider someone who is strongly disgusted by 
members of a particular minority group (the Gs). As suggested above (§§4.3-4.4), such an individual 
would be best served to adopt implementation intentions aimed at helping him both reduce his 
tendency to see members of this group as disgusting (e.g., if I see Gs, I’ll adopt the perspective of 
Martin Luther King, Jr.) and moderate his resulting reject/avoid response (e.g., if I see Gs, I’ll relax 
and be friendly). Importantly, such an effort does not amount to an attempt to directly change his 
disgust response. Rather, it’s a strategy whereby he develops a higher-order capacity to recognize 
situations where his disgust response misfires so that he may engage implementation intentions that 
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will better enable him to control his disgust. In short, when it comes to “cultivating” disgust, our 
focus should be on shaping-by-proxy.9 
The second implication builds from here. The above observations challenge the accounts of 
disgust’s moral value that we get from both skeptics and advocates. For starters, the disgust skeptic’s 
pessimism about our ability to shape our disgust response for the better is overblown. Though the 
skeptic is correct that full-fledged change is unlikely once morally problematic disgust sensitivities 
have been acquired, she’s mistaken in two ways. First, the skeptic is mistaken in thinking that there’s 
little we can do to mitigate the unreliability and harmfulness of our disgust response. While there 
may be little one can do to directly improve reliability, the above discussion of the individual 
disgusted by the Gs highlights how one can indirectly correct problematic disgust. Similarly, 
implementation intentions geared toward moderating disgust’s strong reject/purge response can also 
help lessen the harm that one’s disgust response can bring. Second, the skeptic is wrong to think 
disgust lacks moral value. As we’ve seen, implementation intentions can help mitigate both how 
disgusting one appraises something to be, and how strongly one responds to what one finds 
disgusting (more on this in §6). But this means that implementation intentions can allow us to better 
realize the moral value of fitting disgust felt in the face of hypocrisy, cruelty, pedophilia, and the like.  
The lessons we’ve learned about disgust also cause trouble for advocates of its moral value. 
The advocates are correct both that disgust sensitizes us to a distinctive type of moral wrong—the 
polluting practices and personalities that contaminate beneficial social interactions—and that 
disgust’s strong reject/purge reaction can be a morally appropriate response to these wrongs. But 
advocates are mistaken on three fronts. First, their confidence that disgust will naturally tend to 
                                                 
9 Of note: work on implicit bias suggests that efforts to improve our control over morally problematic disgust might be 
enhanced if approached institutionally—e.g., the use of organizational structures or protocols that raise individuals’ 
awareness of how disgust enters into hiring and admissions decisions (Payne & Vuletich, 2018).  
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track what’s morally contaminating is misplaced. As we’ve seen, (§2, §4.1), the permissiveness and 
speed of disgust’s learning mechanisms, as well as the significant influence caretakers have, means 
that chance plays a large role in determining what moral disgust sensitivities one happens to acquire. 
Second, they over-estimate disgust’s malleability. While disgust sensitivities are easily shaped, they 
resist change once acquired. Finally, in emphasizing education and habituation, advocates make the 
wrong recommendation for how to correct problematic disgust.  
Stepping back, the errors of the skeptics and advocates have a common cause: a mistaken 
account of the moral psychology of disgust. In particular, both sides are wrong about what we can, 
and cannot, do to shape disgust for the better.  
6. Further Implications: Virtue and Its Development 
I close on a more speculative note. Appreciating the limits of our ability to shape (moral) disgust 
may have implications for our understanding of human virtue and its development. In short, what 
we’ve learned suggests—in line with a broadly Kantian picture—that becoming virtuous is more a 
matter of enhancing self-control and less, as Aristotelians propose, a matter of securing psychological 
harmony. To draw this out, I begin by presenting the Aristotelian picture and the trouble that the 
above account of disgust seems to bring. While this sketch will gloss over much of the richness in 
the Aristotelian proposal, it will nonetheless allow us to see how the above lessons about disgust 
suggest that virtue and its development might be better understood in Kantian terms. 
To begin, contemporary Aristotelians build from the familiar distinction between virtuous 
action and merely continent (or encratic) action. According to these Aristotelians, virtuous actions are 
ones where one’s emotions are in harmony with one’s motivations (e.g., one helps from a feeling of 
sympathy). By contrast, with mere continence, one does the right thing despite feeling contrary 
emotions (e.g., one provides assistance but resents having to do it). Importantly, while Aristotelians 
24 
 
see value in encratic actions, they also see them as less valuable than virtuous ones (e.g., Annas, 
2011, p. 67; Hursthouse, 2001; Foot, 1978).  
The Aristotelians’ rendering of virtue in terms of attunement is then combined with a moral 
psychology that emphasizes the malleability of emotion. As Julia Annas explains, on the Aristotelian 
account, our “emotions can be so educated by our developing reason that they become wholly 
transformed” (p. 68, emphasis added; Sherman, 1989, chap. 5; c.f., Hursthouse, 2001, pp. 115-116). So 
understood, moral development is a process whereby one cultivates one’s emotions so that they 
accord with one’s judgments and actions. A corollary to this is that virtuous individuals are more 
admirable because they have substantively shaped—transformed—their emotions so that they’re felt 
at the right time and in the right way.  
From these observations, we can extract two Aristotelian theses about the place of emotion 
in virtue. First, there’s a normative claim about moral development: Moral development should aim to 
transform the learner’s emotions so that they are felt at the right time and in the right way. Second, 
there’s a conceptual claim about the nature of virtue: An action is (fully) virtuous just in case and 
because one’s feelings and motivations to do the right thing form a unified, harmonious whole. 
Importantly, what unifies these two claims is the Aristotelians’ moral psychology—specifically, their 
claim about the malleability of emotion.  
However, given what we’ve learned about disgust, we should be warry of the Aristotelian’s 
account. While emotions like anger, fear, and compassion may be malleable in the manner that the 
Aristotelian’s moral psychology presumes, this is not the case for emotions like disgust. As we’ve 
seen, the tendency for our disgust sensitivities to ossify once acquired means that there’s little we can 
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do to substantively change—much less “wholly transform”—what we’re disgusted by (§§3-4).10 But 
if the Aristotelians’ moral psychology is mistaken, then this should raise doubts about their larger 
account of virtue. The trouble is most acute for their thesis about moral development—it, after all, 
specifically proscribes efforts to transform emotions. But as we’ve seen, the Aristotelians’ moral 
psychology plays a central role in supporting their overall account. So we should also be wary of 
their account of virtue. If there’s little we can do to change or transform problematic disgust 
responses, then why accept the Aristotelians’ universal claim that virtue consists in harmonious 
attunement?  
Of course, Aristotelians are not without avenues of reply. Most obviously, they could appeal 
to the familiar claim that virtue is rare. If it is, then virtue just may not be attainable for those who, 
because of bad luck or insufficient effort, have developed problematic disgust sensitivities. However, 
since Aristotelians are divided on the plausibility of the rarity thesis, this strategy will have limited 
appeal.11 But more significantly, this line of reply also misconstrues the challenge that disgust 
presents. While we should acknowledge the role that luck and effort play in the development of 
virtue, that’s not what is at issue here. Rather, the issue concerns the adequacy of the Aristotelians’ 
moral psychology: Given what we’ve learned about emotions like disgust, human emotions do not 
appear to have the homogeneity that the Aristotelian account presumes and requires. And since the 
claim that emotions are homogeneous helps substantiate the Aristotelian’s larger proposal, the 
troubles with their moral psychology carry over to their overall account of virtue.  
                                                 
10 Importantly, disgust does not appear to be unique in this respect—hatred, for instance, also appears resistant to 
change (Allport, 1979; Brudholm, 2010). 
11 For defenders of rarity, see Miller, 2014; Hursthouse, 2001; for opposition see Stichter, 2018; Annas, 2011. 
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Clearly, more work is needed to assess the challenge that disgust brings to Aristotelian 
accounts of virtue. Rather than taking that up, I want to see what a broadly Kantian alternative to 
the Aristotelian account might look like.  
In contrast with Aristotelians, the Kantian’s moral psychology denies that we are able to 
thoroughly (re-)educate or wholly transform our emotions (Cureton & Hill, 2015; Surprenant, 2014; 
Baxley, 2010). Moreover, the Kantian’s more modest moral psychology also informs her associated 
account of virtue and its development. On this account, human virtue is not understood in terms of 
Aristotelian harmony, but rather self-control. In particular, virtue is understood as the motivational 
strength to overcome contrary emotions and inclinations in order to do the right thing. Moral 
development, then, is a process where one learns how to “comba[t] natural impulses sufficiently to 
be able to master them when a situation comes up in which they threaten morality” (Kant 6: 485, 
598; also, Surprenant, 2014; Baxley, 2010). What, exactly, this learning process involves is an open 
(empirical) question. But the discussion of §5 suggests it should focus on enhancing one’s higher-
order capacity to (i) recognize situations where contrary emotions will be elicited and (ii) engage the 
appropriate response prevention strategy.  
With this sketch in hand, we can see that a Kantian moral psychology fits better with 
empirical findings regarding the limits of our ability to directly change emotions like disgust. In so 
doing, it provides the foundation for an alternative account of virtue and its development. On this 
Kantian account, virtuous action is less a matter of emotional attunement, and more a function of a 
unique form of motivational self-control. More specifically, an action is (fully) virtuous just in case 
and because it manifests one’s ability to overcome contrary emotions and inclinations in order to do 
the right thing. This rendering of virtue then leads to a normative claim about what moral 
development ought to look like—specifically, the central aim of moral education should be the 
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development of the moral understanding and discipline one needs to manifest the self-control 
characteristic of virtue. 
More, of course, is needed to flesh out the contrast between these Kantian and Aristotelian 
accounts. But as a first step toward seeing the appeal of the Kantian proposal, consider what it 
suggests about our earlier example of the individual who is disgusted by Gs. Fleshing out the details, 
suppose this individual’s disgust is the result of an unfortunate upbringing. Suppose further that 
once he recognizes that his disgust is morally problematic, he takes steps to address the issue (e.g., 
engaging implementation intentions of the sort described in §4.3). So though he hasn’t transformed 
the disgust he feels toward Gs, he can now effectively control it. On the Kantian account, such an 
individual could be fully virtuous.  
Aristotelians will find this implausible—how could someone be virtuous despite being 
subject to racist emotional reactions? After all, such an individual’s lingering disgust prevents him 
from seeing Gs as full moral agents: to be disgusted by Gs just is to see Gs as lesser agents. So while 
the individual’s efforts to control his disgust may have value, they do not make him virtuous. Rather, 
he “remain[s] morally inferior” (e.g., Hursthouse, 2001, pp. 116-117; also see, Annas, 2011; Foot, 
1978).12  
But this objection may be too quick. Contra the Aristotelian retort, what we’ve learned about 
the psychology of disgust suggests that disgust does not prevent an individual of the sort we’re 
considering from being able to see Gs as full moral agents. After all, as the discussion of 
implementation intentions revealed, in order for such an individual to have reformed in the ways 
that he did, he needed to develop not just a higher-order awareness of the problematic nature of his 
                                                 
12 It’s worth noting that the claim that disgust presents its target as a lesser moral agent is quite controversial (Plakias, 
2013; Kumar, 2017). 
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disgust toward Gs, but also the self-control to reject and subdue disgust’s impact on his perceptions 
and actions. But to do that just is to recognize, and even embrace, the full personhood of G’s. So 
while more needs to be said to develop and defend this proposal, we can see that—backed with a 
rich, empirically informed moral psychology—the Kantian proposal has much to offer. 
7. Conclusion 
Thinking about disgust with an eye to what empirical work tells us about our ability to shape and 
correct it brings unexpected insights. First, with regard to debates about disgust’s value, we learn 
that both skeptics and advocates are mistaken: disgust is morally valuable, but not in the ways it’s 
standardly thought to be. Second, recognizing that we can control, but not change, disgust also has 
implications for our understanding of human virtue and its development—inviting us to think more 
seriously about a broadly Kantian approach. But the discussion here also suggests that there are 
important differences in the moral psychology of emotions: while emotions like disgust resists our 
efforts to shape them for the better, other emotions—like anger and fear—are more susceptible to 
cultivation. Thus, if we are to develop an accurate account of emotions’ value and relevance for 
virtuous agency, we need to look closely at psychological mechanisms that undergird emotional life. 
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